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CASE NOTES
BAILMENTS - Liability of a Gratuitous Bailor for In-
juries as a Result of Latent Defects in the Bailed Article. -
Bailee delivered his automobile to the defendant-garage owner
for repairs. On being informed that the automobile would not
be ready for several days, the bailee requested the garage
owner to furnish a substitute car, strictly for town use. The
garage owner-bailor supplied the car, but charged no rental,
since to do so required a special license which the garage did
not have. There was evidence that the garage owner on sev-
eral previous occasions had loaned substitute automobiles to
other customers under like circumstances. After delivery of
the car, plaintiff, the bailee's wife, in sliding across the front
seat to alight from the car, cut her leg, apparently on a sharp-
edged strip of metal beneath the dashboard. There was no
evidence that the bailor knew of the defective condition. The
trial court, after giving a verdict for defendant, set aside the
verdict and granted a new trial. On appeal, HELD: Judg-
ment granting new trial reversed, and verdict for defendant
reinstated. A gratuitous bailor is under no liability for in-
juries sustained as a result of latent defects in the bailed
article. Miller v. Hand Ford Sales, Inc., - Ore. - 340 P.2d
181 (1959).
The rights and liabilities of the parties to a bailment are
primarily determined by answering the question whether the
bailment is gratuitous or for mutual benefit. Freeman v.
Myers Auto Service Co., 226 N. C. 736, 40 S.E.2d 365 (1946) ;
Gagnon v. Dana, 69 N. H. 264, 39 Atl. 982 (1898). A bailment
for mutual benefit is one wherein a party gives to another
the temporary use and possession of property for a consider-
ation. Carstensen v. Gottesburen, 215 Cal. 258, 9 P.2d 831
(1932) ; Godfrey v. City of Flint, 284 Mich. 291, 279 N. W.
516 (1938). An uncompensated loan of a chattel for the sole
benefit and use of the borrower is a bailment for gratuitous
use. Ruth v. Hutchinson Gas Co., 209 Minn. 248, 296 N. W.
136 (1941). Where bailor delivered a substitute automo-
bile for the bailee's use while his car was being repaired by
the bailor-garage owner, there was a gratuitous bailment for
the sole benefit of the bailee. Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Rosen-
berg, 179 S.W.2d 476 (Mo. 1944). The bailor of a chattel for
the bailee's gratuitous use has a duty to inform the latter of
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hidden defects of which the bailor is aware. Blom v. MeNeal,
199 Minn. 506, 272 N. W. 599 (1937) ; Jenkins v. Spitler, 120
W. Va. 514, 199 S. E. 368 (1938). But, absent actual know-
ledge of their presence, a gratuitous bailor is not liable for a
failure to warn the bailee of defects in the goods. Johnson v.
H. M. Bullard Co., 95 Conn. 25, 111 AtI. 70 (1920) ; Dicka-
son v. Dickason, 84 Mont. 52, 274 Pac. 145 (1929). Similarly,
a gratuitous bailor need take no affirmative measures to see
that the chattel is free from danger, Davis v. Sanderman, 225
Iowa 1001, 282 N. W. 717 (1938); Ruth v. Hutchinson Gas
Co., supra, and is, therefore, not liable for latent defects.
Penton v. Favors, 262 Ala. 262, 78 So. 2d 278 (1955). Third
persons sharing in the gratuitous use of the bailed chattel
have no greater rights than the bailee and, therefore, the
bailor is under no duty to inspect the chattel for the benefit
of the servants of the bailee, Gagnon v. Dana, supra, or for
the benefit of third parties invited by the bailee to share
in its use. Johnson v. H. M. Bullard Co., supra; The Pegeen,
14 F. Supp. 748 (S. D. Cal. 1936); Knapp v. Gould Automo-
bile Co., 252 App. Div. 430, 299 N. Y. S. 688 (1937).
The holding of the instant case follows logically from the
court's threshold determination, in accordance with estab-
lished legal principles, that the bailment of the car was gra-
tuitous, and that the bailor, accordingly, is substantially ab-
solved from liability for defects in the bailed property. A
finding that the bailment was, in fact, for hire would have
extended the bailor's liability both to defects of which he was
aware and to those which ordinary care would reveal. Such
a finding could be justified by the court's determining some
benefit moving to the bailor as a result of his delivering
the substitute car. There is a well established line of cases
holding that a bailment is not gratuitous where the bailee
accepts articles as a convenience to customers and as a part
of his business. Similarly, there is case law to the effect that
a direct charge for the services is not necessary to constitute
a bailment for hire or mutual benefit if the bailment is in-
cidental and beneficial to the bailee's business. It is submit-
ted that a similar test could properly be applied to find some
benefit moving to a bailor who lends chattels in his regular
business operation. In the instant case, as in many such com-
mercial bailments, loan of a substitute article to be used in
the interim is a recognized way of establishing good customer
relations and securing future business. Moreover, the ga-
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rage owner previously had lent automobiles under similar
circumstances, apparently treating the practice as one of the
functions of his business. Although the bare expectation of
continued trade may be a somewhat tenuous basis for requir-
ing a bailor to inspect every vehicle he lends, nevertheless,
the fact that he has customarily undertaken to lend substi-
tute cars would justify requiring at least a degree of care.
Certainly, it is unrealistic to view such a service as purely
"gratuitous". Although the loan in this case was not to induce
the present repair job, it could readily result in promoting
future business. An additional factor to be considered is the
character of the bailed article. Unlike a substitute watch
loaned by a watchmaker, an automobile is a potentially dan-
gerous instrument, justifying a court in placing on the bailor
a higher standard of care before turning the automobile over
to the bailee. Thus, although the court's decision follows es-
tablished bailment principles once the nature of the bailment
is determined, it is submitted that a liberal view is needed in
such a determination so that the result may be more real-
istic.
ALLEN GARFIELD.
CRIMINAL LAW - Conviction of Lesser Included Of-
fense Bars Retrial of the Greater Where Conviction is Re-
versed. - The defendant was indicted and tried for mur-
der before a jury which was charged that defendant could
be found guilty of first degree murder, second degree murder
with recommendation for life imprisonment, second degree
murder, manslaughter or not guilty. The jury found the de-
fendant guilty of second degree murder and the trial judge
entered sentence thereon. On appeal from the conviction, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed and remanded for
a new trial because of trial errors. Thereafter, the defend-
ant moved for bail contending that he is no longer subject to
be tried for a capital offense because the jury, in convicting
him of second degree, had impliedly acquitted him of first
degree murder, and that a new trial on this count would vio-
late the former jeopardy rule. The motion was denied. On
appeal, HELD: Reversed. Once a defendant has been found
guilty of a lesser included offense there is an implied acquit-
tal of the greater offense and the rule against former jeop-
1960] °
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ardy prevents a second trial. State v. Williams, 30 N. J. 105;
152 A. 2d 9 (1959).
It is believed that the concept of former jeopardy came
into existence during the time of Lord Coke in the seventeenth
century. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 585 - 635 (2d ed. 1899). Lord Coke recognized that once
a jury had been impanelled, a verdict should be reached and
the verdict should dispose of the case for all time. 3 COKE,
INSTITUTES § 229 (b) (1644). It was a rule of the early com-
mon law that an acquittal resulted if a jury or juror was
discharged after being impanelled and sworn but before a
verdict was reached. State v. M'Kee, 1 Bail. L. 651 (S. C.
1830). This rule was later abandoned to allow a new trial
when the defendant consented to a discharge of the jury.
State v. M'Kee, supra; Regina v. Deane, 5 Cox Crim. Cas.
501 (1851). By the time of Blackstone, the doctrine had
evolved into the rule as it is known today. 4 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIS 335 (1796). The former jeopardy rule has
found its way into the Constitution of the United States as
part of the Fifth Amendment: ". . . [N] or shall any person
be subject for the same offense be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb." Similar language appears in the constitutions
or statutes of most states. Annot., 61 A. L. R. 2d 1143 (1958).
The rule will operate when a defendant is tried upon a valid
indictment, before a competent court and jury. State v. Bil-
ton, 156 S. C. 224, 153 S. E. 269 (1929). A defendant is put
in jeopardy at the time a full jury is impanelled and sworn.
Alexander v. Commonwealth, 105 Pa. 1 (1884) ; Bell v. State,
44 Ala. 393 (1870). The rule has no application when a grand
jury has refused to enter a true bill, State v. Vincent, 36 La.
Ann. 770 (1884), or if the court does not have jurisdiction
of the defendant. State v. Rountree, 127 S. C. 261, 121 S. E.
205 (1922). In the early law, there were a few well defined
exceptions to the rule, such as where a defendant gave his
consent or where a juror died during the trial. State v. Bilton,
supra; State v. M'Kee, supra. These exceptions were expanded
into the more liberal rule that a trial court may discharge a
jury for a variety of reasons when in the opinion of the court
"taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a
manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice
would otherwise be defeated." United States v. Perez, 22
U. S. 579 (1824). A defendant may be subjected to a
new trial if there is an arrest of judgment by his own mo-
[Vol. 12
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol12/iss3/6
CASE NoTes
tion, Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. 163 (1873) or if he is granted
a new trial at his request. State ex reZ Francis v. Res-
wever, 329 U. S. 459 (1947); United States v. Ball, 16S
U. S. 662 (1896). The rationale of this doctrine is based
on an implied waiver of the former jeopardy rule by the de-
fendant. United States v. Ball, supra; 15 AM. JuR. Criminal
Law § 427 (1938). Under the waiver doctrine, all states per-
mit a defendant to be tried a second time for the same crime
when he is granted a new trial. State v. Williams, supra;
Annot., 61 A. L. R. 2d 1143 (1958). Some states, including
South Carolina, apply the waiver theory to a situation where,
like the subject case, a defendant is tried for a crime but is
found guilty of a lesser included offense, and allow a new
trial of the defendant for the greater offense. State v. Stead-
man, 216 S. C. 579, 59 S. E. 2d 168, Annot., 61 A. L. R. 2d
1143 (1950). The greater number of states hold that there
is no waiver and that the second trial violates the former
jeopardy rule. Annot., 61 A. L. R. 2d 1143 (1958). The recent
case of Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184 (1957), laid
down this doctrine in the federal courts on the theory that
the defendant is impliedly acquitted of the greater offense
by the finding of guilty of the lesser offense. That case reached
a different result from the earlier case of Trono v. United
States, 199 U. S. 521 (1905). Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a
dissenting opinion in the Green case said that the Trono case
had been overruled. Green v. United States, supra at 214.
The South Carolina Constitution of 1895 contains the same
language pertaining to former jeopardy as does the United
States Constitution. S. C. CONST. art. 1, § 17 (1895). The Court
has said that this language is declaratory of the common law.
State v. Steadman, 216 S. C. 579, 59 S. E. 2d 168 (1950).
South Carolina has held that a defendant may be tried a sec-
ond time for the greater offense. State v. Steadman, supra-
State v. Gillis, 73 S. C. 318, 53 S. E. 487 (1905). The ration-
ale of this doctrine is that when a defendant seeks a reversal,.
he waives his right under the former jeopardy rule and upon
a reversal, the whole issue is completely removed and the de-
fendant stands in the same position as if the first trial had
never existed, State v. Steadman, supra; State v. Commis-
sioners of Cross Roads, 3 Hill L. 239 (S. C. 1837). The test
as to when the former jeopardy rule applies in South Carolina
is said to be ". . . would the evidence necessary to support
the second indictment, have been sufficient to procure a legal
1960]
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conviction of the first." State v. Steadman, supra; State v.
Glasgow, Dud. 40 (S. C. 1837). But meeting this test is not
sufficient when a defendant seeks a reversal since the de-
fendant "waives" the former jeopardy rule in toto. State v.
Steadman, supra; State v. Wyse, 33 S. C. 582, 12 S. E. 556
(1890.)
The New Jersey Court clearly reached the correct result in
the present case. Laying precedent aside, and applying what
would appear to be the basic reason for the rule of former
jeopardy, it seems only fair that if the prosecution has failed
to secure a conviction upon one of several counts or upon a
greater offense, the defendant should be free to seek a re-
view of the convictions obtained by the state without risking
a new trial of the entire case. The "waiver" theory is fic-
tion which is destructive of a basic right written into state
and federal constitutions. South Carolina stands far afield
from the recent decisions since it adheres to the "waiver"
theory. The state, under the South Carolina decisions, has
the opportunity to correct the mistakes it made at the first
trial and to add to the evidence it has accumulated.
LowELL W. Ross.
CRIMINAL LAW - Probable Cause for Arrest Without
a Warrant - Information from Unidentified Informer. -
Defendant was arrested without a warrant on suspicion of
bookmaking and occupying an apartment for the purpose of
recording bets in violation of CAL. PENAL CODE § 337a. One of
the arresting officers had received a tip from an unidenti-
fied informer, who had previously proved reliable, that a
bookmaking operation was being carried on in a certain apart-
ment. The officers obtained a key from the landlord, opened
the door sufficiently to see the operation, and then arrested
the defendant. The Superior Court of Los Angeles set aside
the indictment on the grounds that no reasonable or probable
cause for the arrest was shown. Upon appeal to the Supreme
Court of California, HELD: Reversed. Information from an
informer who had proved reliable in the past constitutes
probable cause for arrest, even when the officer does not
know the identity of the informer. People v. Prewitt, -- Cal.
2d -, 341 P. 2d 1 (1959).
At common law, and subject to the provisions of any ap-
plicatory statute, a peace officer may arrest without a war-
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rant one whom he has reasonable or probable grounds to
suspect of having committed a felony. Carroll v. United
States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925) ; Dowdell v. Owl Drug Co., 121
Cal. App. 53, 8 P. 2d 890 (1932). Probable cause exists where
the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's
knowledge and of which he had reasonable and trustworthy
information are sufficient in themselves to warrant the be-
lief, by a man of reasonable caution, that an offense has been
or is being committed. Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949);
Carroll v. United States, supra. The facts relied upon by the
officer skould be such as would induce a fair-minded man
of average intelligence and judgment to believe that the ac-
cused had committed felony. People v. Ward, 226 Mich. 45,
196 N. W. 971 (1924). The validity of the arrest and the
search must be determined by its reasonableness in the light
of the circumstances of each particular case. United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950) ; Brinegar v. United States,
supra; De Bruhl v. United States, 199 F.2d 175 (D. C. Cir.
1952). Some federal courts have held that this requirement
of probable cause, when arresting without a warrant, is no
less exacting than the requirement of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant. Wrightson v. United States, 222 F.
2d 556 (D. C. Cir. 1955) ; Worthington v. United States, 166
F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1948). But, reasonable grounds or prob-
able cause does not mean prima facie evidence of guilt. United
States v. Keown, 19 F.Supp. 639 (W. D. Ky. 1937). It must,
however, be reasonable to suppose that the person arrested
is guilty. United States v. Bianco, 189 F.2d 716 (3d Cir.
1951) ; United States v. Gowen, 40 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1930) ;
Kennedy v. State, 139 Miss. 579, 104 So. 449 (1925). What is
reasonable is a total judgment. United States v. Bianco, supra.
Mere suspicion is not enough, even on the charge of commis-
sion of a felony. Cook v. Singer Sewing Machine Co., 138 Cal.
App. 418, 32 P.2d 430 (1934); Edwards v. State, 198 Ind.
170, 152 N. E. 721 (1926) ; Hughes v. State, 145 Tenn. 544,
238 S. W. 588, 20 A. L. R. 639 (1921). Suspicion must be
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person arrested
is guilty. Darden v. Commonwealth, 298 S. W. 2d 687 (Ky.
1957). It has been held that if illegally obtained evidence is
the sole basis of an indictment, the defendant would be held
without reasonable or probable cause. People v. Valenti, 45
19601
7
et al.: CASE NOTES
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTRLY
Cal. 2d 199, 316 P.2d 633 (1957). Some jurisdictions require
that the officer must have reasonable grounds for believing
that the person will escape. Rippy v. State, 122 Tex. Crim.
101, 53 S.W.2d 619 (1931) ; State v. Phillips, 163 Wash. 207,
300 Pac. 521 (1931). In making the arrest, the officer may
rely upon facts within his own knowledge or those communi-
cated to him by a responsible person. People v. Ward, 226
Mich. 45, 196 N. W. 971 (1924) ; Falls v. Palmetto Power &
Light Co., 117 S. C. 327, 109 S. E. 93 (1921). Information
must come from a credible third person. Constant v. State,
155 Tex. Crim. 6, 229 S.W.2d 791 (1950); Cook v. Singer
Sewing Machine Co., supra. An informer's tip has been held
to constitute probable cause where the information has proved
to be reliable in the past, Draper v. United States, supra, but
not where the officer arrested the defendant on an uncorrob-
orated tip, the identity and reliability of the informer being.
unknown. Contee v. United States, 215 F.2d 324 (D. C. Cir.
1954) ; Brown v. United States, 4 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1925).
However, in the absence of some pressing emergency, People
v. Kilvington, 104 Cal. 86, 37 Pac. 799 (1894), an arrest may
not be based solely on such information. United States v.
Kind, 87 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1937) ; United States v. Blich, 45
F.2d 627 (D. Wyo. 1930). The federal courts have found that
there were reasonable grounds on which to make a valid
arrest when the information from the informer is combined
with the arresting officer's personal knowledge and obser-
vation of the defendant, or where he knows or has reasonable
grounds to believe that an informer is reliable, Rodgers v.
United States, 267 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1959), but not when the
only knowledge of the commission of a crime is the informa-
tion from an informer whose reliability is unknown. Con-
tee v. United States, supra; Worthington v. United States,
supra.
A major objection to reliance on information from an un-
identified informer, even when the informer has proved re-
liable in the past, is that the courts need to know the source
of the officer's information so that they, and not the arrest-
ing officer, may determine whether there was reasonable or
probable cause for the arrest. In the present case, the Cali-
fornia court refused to assume that the officer would com-
mit perjury in testifying as to probable cause, but, in any
event, cross-examination would aid in determining whether
or not the officer acted in good faith. It is true that criminal
[Vol. 12
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conspiracies are organized on a vast scale and encompass
large areas of the nation, and that there is a need for im-
mediate action to apprehend the criminals to prevent their
escape; however, constitutional guaranties apply to all citi-
zens equally, and the basis for arrest should not be relaxed
unless a definite need to do so is shown. Reliance on informers
is prevalent in law enforcement practice today, and such
practice can continue to be effective while maintaining con-
stitutional safeguards. It is not unreasonable to require that
an officer support an arrest without a warrant, where the
grounds therefor are suspicion of having committed a felony,
with other circumstances in addition to the information from
the unidentified informer.
EDWARD P. BLANTON, JR.
LABOR LAW - Taft-Hartley Act - Federal Pre-emp-
tion of State Jurisdiction. - Plaintiff employee was dis-
charged by defendant for joining a labor union. North Caro-
lina's Right to Work Act provides that any person being so
discharged shall be entitled to recover such damages as he may
have sustained due to such denial or deprivation of employ-
ment. Plaintiff filed a charge against defendant with the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, asserting that his alleged wrong-
ful discharge was an unfair labor practice under section
158 (a) (1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U. S. C. §§ 141-197 (1952), as amended, but the general coun-
sel refused to issue a complaint on the grounds that the impact
of the employer's business on interstate commerce did not sat-
isfy the Board's announced jurisdictional standards. There-
after plaintiff brought an action for damages in the North
Carolina courts for the alleged wrongful discharge pursuant
to North Carolina's Right to Work Law, and the trial court
awarded $1,000 damages. On appeal, HELD: Affirmed. The
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29
U. S. C. §§ 141-197 (1952), does not deprive a state court of
jurisdiction to award damages under the state Right to Work
Law to an employee who was discharged for joining a union
and was denied NLRB relief because of a failure to satisfy the
Board's jurisdictional requirements. Willard v. Huffman, 250
N. C. 396, 109 S. E. 2d 233 (1959), cert. denied, __ U. S. -'
4 L. Ed. 2d 150 (1959).
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act grants em-
19601
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ployees the right to organize and bargain collectively [49
STAT. 449 (1935-36), as amended 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29
U. S. C. § 157 (1952)] and Section 8 proscribes certain em-
ployer and union activities as unfair labor practices [49 STAT.
449 (1935-36) as amended by 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U. S. C.
§ 158(b) (1952)], as determined by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board. Although Congress intended to exercise its com-
merce power to the fullest extent, NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306
U. S. 601, 83 L. Ed. 1014 (1939), the Act nevertheless "leaves
much to the states." United Construction Workers v. La-
burnum Construction Corporation, 347 U. S. 656, 98 L. Ed.
1025 (1954). Accordingly, "the Supreme Court has had num-
erous occasions to deal with the delicate problem of the inter-
play between state and federal jurisdictions touching labor re-
lations," Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468, 99 L.
Ed. 546 (1955), although the areas of displaced state power
are not "susceptible of delimitation by fixed metes and
bounds." Thus states may not enjoin under local labor or
other legislation conduct protected by federal law, e.g., Hill v.
Florida, 325 U. S. 538, 89 L. Ed. 1782 (1945); Garner v.
Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485, 98 L. Ed. 228 (1957) (dic-
tum), or proscribed by federal law, Weber v. Anheuser-Busch
Inc., supra at 475-476, although state action may apparently
reach conduct neither prohibited nor proscribed by federal
law, United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board, 336 U. S. 245, 93 L. Ed. 651 (1949) (quickie
work stoppages). But cf. San Diego Building & Trades Coun-
oil v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775, 785 (1959)
(concurring opinion); NLRB v. Insurance Agents Interna-
tional Union, 361 U. S. 812, 4 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1960). States
may regulate activities which are merely of "peripheral con-
cern" to federal law, or which "touch interests . . . deeply
rooted in local feeling or responsibility," and the remedy em-
ployed (whether injunctive or damages) is not decisive.
San Diego Building & Trades Council v. Garmon, supra. Thus
states have permissibly granted relief against union activi-
ties involving violence, or threats thereof, United Construc-
tion Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corporation, supra
(damages); United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U. S.
634, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1030 (1958) (damages), against mass pick-
eting, Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 353 U. S. 131, 2 L. Ed. 2d
151 (1957) (injunction), and improper expulsion of a mem-
ber by his union, International Association of Machinists v.
[Vol. 12
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Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1018 (1958) (member-
ship reinstatement and damages ordered). However, if ac-
tivity is "arguably subject" to the federal law prohibition or
protection, determination of this issue must be left "in the
first instanc " to the "exclusive primary competence of the
Board" thereby displacing state jurisdiction. San Diego Build-
ing & Trades Council v. Garmon, supra at 244-245. Hence, the
earlier practice of courts (including the Supreme Court) to
determine judicially whether certain union activity is fed-
erally prohibited or protected, in order to find a proper basis
for state court jurisdiction (see United Automobile Workers
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, supra) is "a now
discarded approach to pre-emption," NLRB v. Insurance
Agents International Union, supra.
Apart from problems of defining the sphere of state and
federal acti6n in the labor field, the NLRB may cede to the
state agencies jurisdiction of labor cases otherwise subject
to NLRB jurisdiction if state law is not inconsistent with
corresponding federal law. 61 STAT. 146 (1941) as amended,
29 U. S. C. § 160 (a) (1952). In addition, although the Board
will decline to hear designated categories of cases within its
jurisdiction but excluded under Board-announced standards as
to size and type of industry, a formal cession agreement is
necessary to permit state jurisdiction to attach to those cases
which the Board has declined or obviously would decline. Guss
v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U. S. 1, 1 L. Ed. 2d 601
(1957) (as to injunctive relief) ; San Diego Building & Trades
Council v. Garmon, supra (as to damages). State action simi-
larly is barred although the NLRB general counsel refuses to
file a complaint or the Board "adopts some other disposition"
of the case. San Diego Building & Trades Council v. Garmon,
supra. Under section 701 of the Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act of 1959, the Board is authorized to
decline jurisdiction over labor disputes "involving any class
or category of employers where, in the opinion of the Board,
the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not suffi-
ciently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction,"
and states are permitted to "assume and assert jurisdiction"
over such declined labor disputes. 73 STAT. 519 (1959), 29
U. S. C. §§ 401-531 (1952).
The instant case affords another glimpse into the "no-man's
land" recognized by the Supreme Court's Guss decision as a
necessary implication of federal statutes construed as pre-
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empting the field of labor relations. The North Carolina Court,
apparently refusing to accept Guss as a binding precedent,
held that where the NLRB had declined jurisdiction for want
of the requisite dollar volume of interstate business under
Board standards, the state is free to apply relevant state law
to the dispute. This determination appears clearly erroneous
in the light of the contrary Supreme Court declarations in
the post-Guss decisions in San Diego 11 and Insurance Agents.
Moreover, the Court's apparent finding that "the employer
and his employees are engaged exclusively in intrastate busi-
ness which does not affect interstate commerce" is contra-
dicted by its own statement of facts. However, it is not sur-
prising that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case,
since the decision, in result if not in reasoning, seems to im-
plement national (as well as state) policy against employers'
discriminatory discharges because of employees' union ac-
tivity or membership - a seldom noticed, although typical,
feature of the so-called "right to work" statutes. Moreover,
the present case illustrates one consequence of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 1959 - en-
acted after the North Carolina Court's decision - since sec-
tion 701 would seem clearly to sustain state authority to
award damages to an employee discharged as here, where the
NLRB had declined jurisdiction of his charge. On the other
hand, the statutory language does not authorize state action
where the labor dispute meets Board jurisdictional standards,
but the general counsel refuses to issue a complaint, or the
Board dismisses the case because no Taft-Hartley Act violation
is found. Several states have already taken affirmative action
to implement state policy in the former "no-man's land," in-
cluding, notably, New York's newly instituted procedure per-
mitting legitimate labor organizations to challenge in election
proceedings "paper" or "phony" union locals, and collusive
or "sweetheart" agreements. Such action reveals the construc-
tive possibilities inherent in the now recognized state power to
act in this field. Thus, despite the fact that many states will
likely not take advantage of such opportunities, and that
some may take action contrary to national labor policy, the
enactment of section 701 is a desirable step forward to pro-
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TORTS - Immunity From Liability for Defamation -
Broadcasters Allowing Reply to Political Speeches Under
Federal Communications Act. - The defendant, a North
Dakota radio-television station, in accord with § 315 of the
Federal Communications Act, allowed a senatorial candidate
to make a speech in reply to an earlier address by a candi-
date for the same office. The station felt compelled by the
Act to allow the speech, in which the plaintiff was called
a communist organization, to be broadcast without censor-
ship, and as a result the station was sued for defamation.
The District Court of North Dakota, affirmed by its Su-
preme Court, held that the statute gave the broadcaster im-
munity from liability for defamation. On certiorari, HELD:
Affirmed (five to four). The majority held that the statute,
in denying absolutely any right of censorship, granted a cor-
responding immunity from an action for defamation, since
to hold otherwise would be "unconscionable" and contrary
to the policy of Congress. The dissent, while agreeing that the
statute forbade censorship, denied that it conferred any im-
munity. Farmers Ed. & Coop. Union of America v. WDAY,
360 U. S. 525, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1407 (1959).
Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act, 48 STAT.
1088, as amended, 47 U. S. C. 315 (a) (1934), is the same as
the earlier § 18 of the Radio Act of 1927, 44 STAT. 1170
(1927) ; rind the earlier cases are a construction of the pre-
vious statute. Section 315 provides:
(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a le-
gally qualified candidate for any public office to use a
broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities
to all other such candidates for that office in the use of
such broadcasting station: Provided, that such licensee
shall have no power of censorship over the material
broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obli-
gation is imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of
its station by any such candidate.
Though the Act was first passed in 1927, the initial decision
by the Federal Communications Commission under § 315
came in 1948, when in In re Port Huron Broadcasting Co., 12
F. C. C. 1069 (1948), it was held that the licensee had no
power of any kind to censor speeches of reply candidates be-
cause of defamatory statements, and that the statute granted
the broadcaster immunity from an action for defamation since
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§ 315 was a federal occupation of the field, supplanting state
laws. The Commission has since made further statements re-
asserting this position. In re WDSU Broadcasting Corp., 7
Pike and Fischer Rad. Reg. 769 (1951) ; Public Notice (FCC
54-1155) Use of Broadcasting Facilities by Candidates For
Public Office, 19 Fed. Reg. 5948, 5951; Public Notice (FCC
58-936) Use of Broadcasting Facilities by Candidates For
Public Office, 23 Fed. Reg. 7817, 7820, 7821. The legislative
and subsequent history of the section show that several at-
tempts were made to include an immunity provision, but that
they all failed of passage. H. R. 1886, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., §§
10, 18 (1935) ; S. 814, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., § 11 (1943) ; S.
1333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 15 (1947); H. R. 3995, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., §15 (1947) ; H. R. 6949, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 202 (1950) ; H. R. 2426, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., § 21 (1952) ;
S. 1437, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., § 401 (1957). The first court
decision construing the statute held the station liable because
the Court read the provision prohibiting censorship to apply
only to the political and partisan content of the speech, and
not to the defamatory material. Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb.
348, 243 N. W. 82, 82 A. L. R. 1908 (1932), appeal dismissed
sub nom. 290 U. S. 599, 78 L. Ed. 527 (1933). The only other
case not granting some immunity or privilege under the sta-
tute is Houston Post v. U. S., 79 F. Supp. 199 (S. D. Tex.
1948), a declaratory judgment proceeding brought by a broad-
caster for an interpretation of the Federal Communications
Commission decision, In re Port Huron Broadcasting Co.,
supra. The Court held that this decision did not have the force
of an order and was not binding on the station. The first case
granting immunity, Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting
Co., 179 Misc. 787, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 985 (1942), found for the de-
fendant on two grounds, first, that since § 315 creates an un-
avoidable statutory obligation there should be a corresponding
qualified privilege, and second, even if there were no qualified
privilege the broadcaster should not be held liable for an ex-
temporaneous statement. Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Sta-
tions, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 740 (E. D. Pa. 1950), held that since
§ 315 prohibited the power to censor, the Pennsylvania rule
against absolute liability of broadcasters, Summit Hotel v.
NBC, 336 Pa. 182, 8 A. 2d 302 (1939), granted immunity.
This case was reversed on the ground that the statute applied
only to the candidate himself and not to his supporters. Felix
v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., 186 F. 2d 1 (3d Cir.
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1950). The Connecticut Court held that statutory duty to
broadcast without a power to censor granted a qualified privi-
lege, The Charles Parker Co. v. The Silver City Crystal Co.,
142 Conn. 605, 116 A. 2d 440 (1955). The last case to con-
strue the statute before the present litigation found that
Congress had occupied the field of defamation by broadcas-
ters in reply to political speeches, and, therefore, there was
immunity. Lamb v. Sutton, 164 F. Supp. 928 (M. D. Tenn.
1958).
Settling the conflicting lower court decisions, the United
States Supreme Court in this case held a station licensee not
liable for a defamatory political speech replying to a previous
speech made through its station by another candidate for the
same office. However, the case gives no inkling of the result
where the broadcaster has conspired with a political candi-
date to defame a third party, although basic fairness would
seemingly require liability in such a case. Also, no illumina-
tion is given on the problem of the first candidate defaming
someone. In such a case, the broadcaster would be under no
duty to allow the speech. Even though the fact that the broad-
caster was forced to allow the speech was an important fac-
tor in the decision, the Court placed strong emphasis upon
the Congressional intent of encouraging free political debate,
and a decision extending immunity to an initial broadcast
would not be surprising. The majority based its decision on
two persuasive points, namely, that to force a station to
broadcast a speech and yet allow it to be liable for any re-
sulting defamation would be "unconscionable," and that the
imposition of liability on a broadcaster would tend to dis-
courage sale of time to all political candidates and thus "...
stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Farmers Ed.
& Coop. Union of America v. WDAY, supra. The dissent at-
tacked the majority opinion on three grounds: (1) Section
315 does not grant to broadcasters an implied immunity. (2)
There have not been consistent administrative rulings by
the FCC in favor of immunity; such rulings as have been
made have not been impliedly adopted by Congress, and the
rulings made were not in the nature of interpretations of
the statute. Throughout the Supreme Court's history, one of
its most important functions has been to reconcile under the
Supremacy Clause possibly conflicting state and federal law.
Therefore, an administrative decision holding a state field
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to be pre-empted by federal law is given little weight by the
Court. (3) Section 315, alone, or in conjunction with the rest
of the Act, does not manifest an intention by Congress to
oust state laws from application to licensees, and there is no
repugnance or conflict of a sufficiently direct nature between
federal and state law in this field to make coexistence impossi-
ble.
Although the majority opinion seems just and equitable,
it is questionable that the Court's reading of the statute is
correct, since Congress has considered and rejected a simi-
lar position several times in the past. Considering the fact
that Congress is more willing to amend statutes after the
Court has given them a policy-making construction than to
correct defects before such action, the result is probably de-
sirable in that it removes doubt from an important area.
COMING BALL GIBBS, JR.
TORTS - Municipal Immunity - Purchase of Liabil-
ity Insurance as a Waiver of Immunity. - Plaintiff sued
the city, its insurer, and three police officers alleging per-
sonal injuries resulting from the officers' wrongful con-
duct in arresting the plaintiff. Plaintiff claimed he was the
beneficiary of a bond entered into between the city and the
insurer "to indemnify the City of Florence . . . for the
use and benefit of the Police Department against any loss
or losses caused to the [Police Department] through the
failure of such employees to perform faithfully [their]
duties". The trial court sustained the city's demurrer hold-
ing that the city was under no statutory liability for the
torts of its officers; the insurer's demurrer was sustained on
the ground that the policy was not for the benefit of the
plaintiff, but only indemnified the city for the use and bene-
fit of the police department. HELD: Affirmed. The city is
without power to waive its immunity by taking out liability
insurance, and the bond created no right of action in the
person injured. McKenzie v. City of Florence, 234 S. C. 42S,
108 S. E. 2d 825 (1959).
It is generally conceded that the doctrine of municipal im-
munity from suit and from tort liability stems from the rule
of Russell v. The Men of Devon, 2 Term Rep. 667, 100 Eng.
Rep. 359 (1798). The majority view in the United States
is that this immunity cannot be waived by the purchase of
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liability insurance, Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kern-
merer, 338 P. 2d 808 (Wyo. 1959); 18 MCQUILLIN, MUNICI-
PAL CORPORATIONS, § 53.28 (3d ed. 1950), since a municipal
corporation is without power to waive its immunity in any
circumstances absent legislative authority. Stephenson v. City
of Raleigh, 232 N. C. 42, 59 S. E. 2d 195 (1950) ; Brooks v.
One Motor Bus, 190 S. C. 379, 3 S. E. 2d 42 (1939). Some state
statutes have allowed limited recovery against municipal cor-
porations for the torts of their servants and agents, N. C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 160-191.1 (1952) (waiving immunity as to
motor vehicles up to the amount of insurance carried), as
have some judicial decisions. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa
Beach, Fla., 96 So. 2d 130, 60 A. L. R. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1957).
However, most jurisdictions say that any limitations or re-
strictions on the long-standing doctrine of municipal im-
munity are for the legislature to change and not the courts.
Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, supra, (analyz-
ing and criticising the Hargrove case, supra); Cushman v.
Grafton County, 97 N. H. 32, 79 A. 2d 630 (1951). Since
municipal immunity must be considered as having two phases:
i.e., immunity from suit and immunity from tort liability,
54 MICH. L. REV. 404 (1956), and since statutes waiving im-
munity are in derogation of the common law and must be
strictly construed, McGrath Building Co. v. City of Betten-
dorf, 248 Ia. 1386, 85 N. W. 2d 616 (1957) ; Johnson v. Board
of Road Commissioners, 253 Mich. 465, 235 N. W. 221 (1931),
a statute which authorizes a city to purchase liability insur-
ance and provides that the insurer shall not use the defense
of municipal immunity does not waive the municipality's im-
munity from suit. Hummer v. School City of Hartford City,
124 Ind. App. 30, 112 N. E. 2d 891 (1953). A statute may
waive municipal immunity solely to determine the insurer's
liability, Taylor v. Knox County Board of Education, 292 Ky.
767, 167 S. W. 2d 700, 145 A. L. R. 1333 (1942), but under
such statutes, the insurer's refusal to pay requires the plain-
tiff to bring another suit in the name of the county against
the insurer, since the county funds cannot be used to pay the
judgment. Taylor v. Knox County Board of Education, supra;
Rogers v. Butler, 170 Tenn. 125, 92 S. W. 2d 414 (1936). This
would indicate that a waiver of immunity from suit is not a
waiver of immunity from tort liability. 54 MICH. L. REV. 404
(1956). Contrary to most authority, some jurisdictions hold
that the purchase of liability insurance waives both forms of
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immunity, even in the absence of statutory authority. Bailey
v. City of Knoxville, 113 F. Supp. 3 (E. D. Tenn. 1953);
City of Kingsport v. Lane, 35 Tenn. 183, 243 S. W. 2d 289
(1951). If there is no waiver of either immunity, the insured
should be allowed to recover the premiums paid. Board of
Education of County of Raleigh v. Commercial Casualty In-
surance Co., 116 W. Va. 503, 182 S. E. 87 (1935). The mere
fact that a legislative enactment empowers a municipal cor-
poration to purchase liability insurance does not imply a
waiver of any immunity unless that intent is clearly indi-
cated in the statute. McGrath Building Co. v. City of Betten-
dorf, supra; Hummer v. School City of Hartford City, supra.
Whenever a statute partly waives immunity and authorizes
the municipality to purchase liability insurance, a plain-
tiff's suit must comply with the terms of the statute, Fisher
v. City and County of Denver, 123 Colo. 158, 225 P. 2d 828,
23 A. L. R. 2d 963 (1950), and the terms of the policy. Ford
v. City of Caldwell, 79 Idaho 499, 321 P. 2d 589 (1958). The
terms of the policy cannot enlarge the city's liability, although
the insurer agrees not to plead the municipal immunity as a
defense, Hummer v. School City of Hartford City, supra, nor
does the insurer's covenant not to plead the city's immunity
generally give the public a right to sue on the policy. Arnold
v. Walton, 205 Ga. 606, 54 S. E. 2d 424 (1949). A statute
requiring faithful performance bonds of city officials does
not authorize the city to purchase liability insurance, Maffei
v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 338 P. 2d 808 (Wyo.
1959), and no action can be maintained on an official bond
by a third party absent a statute. Stephenson v. City of Ra-
leigh, 232 N. C. 42, 59 S. E. 2d 195 (1950); 42 Am. JuR.
Public Officers § 440 (1942). The bond is for the faithful
performance of the officer and is for the benefit of the city.
U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Jasper, 56 Tex. Civ. App.
236, 120 S. W. 1145 (1909). The legislative intent to protect
the public by statutory bonds must usually be expressed in the
statute, Rogers v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 225 S. C.
298, 81 S. E. 2d 896 (1954), and if the bond is payable only
to the city as the insured, the surety on the bond is not liable
to the public in absence of statute. Benton v. Board of Educa-
tion of Cumberland County, 201 N. C. 653, 161 S. E. 96
(1931). But it has been held that the surety, by executing the
bond, made the city the trustee for any persons who are in-
jured by a breach of the conditions of the bond. Richardson v.
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Trail, 85 W. Va. 386, 101 S. E. 732 (1920), and some juris-
dictions hold that the bonds are made payable to the city for
the benefit of individuals although the bond does not so pro-
vide. Robinson v. Sheehan, 173 Ill. App. 464 (1912) ; Hollis-
ter v. Hubbard, 11 S. D. 461, 78 N. W. 949 (1899).
An analogy is often drawn between municipal immunity
and charitable immunity, but the analogy is not particularly
apt, since the immunities of the two are based on different
grounds. Whereas charitable immunity is designed to pro-
tect the trust fund and to prevent its diversion from its in-
tended purposes, the immunity of a municipality is considered
an extension of the sovereign immunity, where the protec-
tion of the public funds is only one of the objectives. It
seems that the only jurisdictions which grant municipal im-
munity to protect the public funds are those which allow the
immunity to be waived by the purchase of liability insur-
ance. However, in view of modern legal thought, these juris-
dictions are correct in their holdings, for the other bases of
municipal immunity - "the King can do no wrong", "it is
better for the individual to suffer than the public generally",
etc. - have no significance in our society. As was said in
the Hargrove case, supra, the idea that "the King could do
no wrong" led to the Declaration of Independence, and one
of the basic theories of our legal system is "a remedy for
every wrong". Despite possible exaggeration, these state-
ments illustrate the point that, for all practical purposes,
the only sound basis for continuing municipal immunity is
the protection of the public funds, and with the purchase
of liability insurance even this basis is removed. Considering
the fact that government is becoming our biggest business,
and that its expanded operations create even greater liabili-
ties, it seems the doctrine of Russell v. Men of Devon, supra,
should be viewed as applying only to a simple, rural society,
and that a more realistic doctrine could be developed for our
own day. Although most courts admit the Men of Devon case
was judicial legislation, they feel that long judicial acquies-
cence in its policy prevent their changing the rule, and that
injured persons are compensated by the court's kind and
sympathetic language. While this may be true, most plain-
tiffs would feel better compensated if their rewards were in
terms of dollars, and liability insurance furnishes the an-
swer to this problem.
Apart from the argument of liability insurance, there seems
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to be no reason why a direct action should not be allowed
against the officer's surety in cases such as the principal one.
If the municipality is not liable for the torts of its agents, the
surety contract should be held to be for the benefit of the
public, and the surety should be required to waive the defense
of municipal immunity. In a case similar to the McKenzie
case, supra, as to the factual situation, the Illinois Appellate
Court said in the Cairo case, supra, "It is difficult to under-
stand for whose benefit the condition was made if not for
those whom he might unlawfully assault while being arrested
or under arrest. The obligee would have no interest in such
malfeasance of the officer and would not be liable therefor".
An interesting question not raised in this case is that pre-
sented by Section 50-76, Code of Laws of S. C., 1952, which
provides that "the bond of any public officer in this State may
at all times be sued upon by the public, any corporation or
private person aggrieved by any misconduct of such public
officer." Two cases in this State would seem to include a
city policeman within the definition of "public officer" as
used in this statute. In Edge v. Cayce, 187 S. C. 171, 197
S. E. 216 (1938), Section 50-1, Code of Laws of S. C., 1952,
wherein the term "public officer" as used in Section 50-76 is
defined, was held to include the chief of police of a munici-
pality. In Sanders v. Belue, 78 S. C. 171, 58 S. E. 762 (1907),
the Court said the term included all whose duties were de-
fined by law. If this reasoning were followed, the fact that
the bond ran to the city as obligee would not necessarily be
controlling, for the terms of Section 50-76 would have to be
read into the bond. Thompson v. Bass, 167 S. C. 345, 166 S. E.
346 (1932) ; Barringer v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 161 S. C. 4,
159 S. E. 373 (1931).
D. KENNETH BAKER.
'TORTS - Proximate Cause - Liability for Suicide.
- In accordance with customary business practices, the dece-
dent, a diamond broker, took possession of a diamond from
a wholesaler by informal written consignment with the un-
derstanding that the stone would be returned upon demand.
The decedent in turn delivered the stone on consignment to
the defendants, diamond dealers, in order that they might
find a purchaser. In a wrongful death action, the plaintiff,
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decedent's personal representative, alleged that the defend-
ants, with knowledge of the decedent's lack of title, wrong-
fully converted the diamond with intent to injure the dece-
dent's reputation and that the decedent, as a direct result of
their malicious action, committed suicide. HELD: Motion
to dismiss the cause of action denied. Where suicide is com-
mitted in a state of insanity in response to an uncontrollable
impulse, recovery may be had if the mental state of the dece-
dent was caused by the defendant's wrongful act. Cauverien
v. De Metz, 188 N. Y. S. 2d 627 (1959).
No action lies at common law to recover damages for the
death of a human being caused by the wrongful or negligent
act of another. St. Louis R. R. v. Craft, 237 U. S. 648, 59 L. Ed.
1160 (1915); Cummins v. Woody, 177 Tenn. 686, 152 S. W.
2d 246 (1940). But see, Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90, 1 Am.
Dec. 61 (Conn. 1794). This was changed in 1846 in England
by the passage of Lord Campbell's Act which allows a civil
action for wrongful death. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93. Every Ameri-
can state now has a statutory remedy for wrongful death,
most of them modeled upon the English Statute. N. Y. DECE-
DENT ESTATE LAw 130; SOUTH CAROLINA CODE OF LAWS §
10-1951 (1952). However, to sustain a death action, the
wrongful act complained of must have been the proximate
cause of the death. Denton v. Midwest Dairy Prod. Corp., 284
Ill. App. 279, 1 N. E. 2d 807 (1936) ; Scott v. Greenville Phar-
macy, 212 S. C. 485, 48 S. E. 2d 324, 11 A. L. R. 2d 745 (1948).
A specific problem in regard to the question of extending
liability arises in the case of an intervening force. RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 441 (1934). Normally, a wrongdoer will not
be relieved of liability by an intervening force which could
reasonably have been foreseen, nor by one which is a normal
incident of the risk created. Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111
Mass. 136 (1872); Gilman v. Nayes, 57 N. H. 627 (1876).
Other cases hold that a tort action may be maintained, re-
gardless of an intervening cause, where the wrongdoer's act
rises to the position of a "substantial factor" in producing
the decedent's death. Squires v. Reynolds, 125 Conn. 366, 5
A. 2d 877, 66 A. L. R. 1121 (1939) ; SMITH, LEGAL CAUSE IN
ACTIONS OF TORT, 25 lLmnv. L. REV. 223, 251 (1912). How-
ever, the practically unanimous rule is that when the inter-
vening cause takes the form of suicide, it is a new and in-
dependent agency which does not come within and complete
a line of causation from the wrongful act to the death, and,
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therefore, does not render the wrongdoer liable for the suicide.
Schaffer v. Washington City, V. M. & G. S. R. R., 105 U. S. 249,
26 L. Ed. 1070 (1882) ; Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 Fed. 92 (2d Cir.
1921) ; Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy, supra. Some early de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and some
other courts have held that if one, by reason of his insanity,
is unable to appreciate the nature and qualities of his own
act in its relation to the moral world so that he is not crimin-
ally responsible for it, he does not commit suicide, in the full
sense of the word, if he willfully takes his own life. Mutual L.
Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580, 21 L. Ed. 236 (1873); Man-
hattan L. Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 109 U. S. 121, 27 L. Ed. 878
(1883); Breasted v. Farmer's Loan & T. Co., 8 N. Y. 299,
59 Am. Dec. 482 (1852). In line with this view, some courts
hold that where a wrongful act produces such a rage or frenzy
that the injured person destroys himself during such rage
or frenzy, or in response to an uncontrollable impulse, the
act is considered within and a part of the line of causation
from the wrongdoer's act to the death and this wrongful act
is the proximate cause of the death. Elliott v. Stone Baking
Co., 49 Ga. App., 515, 176 S. E. 2d 112 (1934); Danials v.
New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N. E. 424, 62
L. R. A. 751 (1903). Thus, there is some authority to the
effect that, when the decedent's insanity prevents him from
realizing the nature of his act or controlling his conduct, his
suicide should be regarded either as a direct result and no
intervening cause at all, or as a normal incident of the risk
for which the wrongdoer will be liable. Danials v. New York,
N. H. & H. R. R., supra; Arsnow v. Red Top Cab Co., 159
Wash. 137, 292 Pac. 436 (1930) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 274 (2d
ed. 1955).
Because of infrequent litigation concerning the novel ques-
tion of liability for suicide, there is considerable room for
growth of the law in this area. In the past, judicial minds
seem to have been offended at the thought of holding a wrong-
doer liable for the suicide of the injured person. Thus, the
overwhelming majority of the courts have come to the con-
clusion that suicide should be considered an independent
agency breaking the chain of causation between the tortious
act and the death. However, the view allowing recovery
if the suicide is committed in a state of insanity in response
to an uncontrollable impulse caused by the wrongful act seems
to be gaining ground. This view is supported both by the more
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liberal trends in extending tort liability and the advances
in medical science and knowledge of mental illness. When, as
in the instant case, there is alleged a wilful and malicious in-
tent to commit a wrongful act, the jury should be allowed to
decide whether or not death by suicide could be the natural,
proximate and legal consequence of the tort.
JAMES Z. HowEy.
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